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Abstract:  In this study, we use firm-level data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business 
Finances to test the hypothesis that banking consolidation has reduced the availability of credit 
to small businesses.  We find that banks in markets where mergers have occurred are more likely 
than other banks to deny credit to small business loan applicants.  However, this relationship 
disappears after we control for characteristics of the small business firm and its principal owner, 
the economic environment of the market where the firm is located, and the financial condition of 
the prospective lender.  Moreover, we find that one set of banks, those in the process of 
acquiring other banks, are less likely to deny credit to small businesses.  These results suggest 
that consolidation in the banking industry may have enhanced rather than restricted the 
availability of credit to small businesses.   However, the data reflect credit availability during 
1991-94, and may not be representative of subsequent credit conditions.  Nor does the analysis 
rule out possible changes in the terms of credit available to small businesses. 
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Banking Consolidation and  
the Availability of Credit to Small Businesses 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
In recent years, the consolidation of the commercial banking industry has received much 
attention both from the popular press and from academics (see, e.g., Goldberg and White 1998; 
Peek and Rosengren 1998; Strahan and Weston 1998; Berger et al.  1997; Walraven 1997; 
Keeton 1996; Pilloff 1996; Houston and Ryngaert 1994; Schrantz 1993; Cornett and Tehranian 
1992), as the number of banks has declined from 14,400 as of year-end 1980 to approximately 
9,500 as of year-end 1997.  Moreover, the actual consolidation that has occurred in the banking 
industry has been even greater because during this period an additional 5,000 banks were 
acquired and became subsidiaries of bank holding companies. 
Some of the main benefits of consolidation include reduction of excess capacity, 
improved diversification, and the additional discipline brought to bear on bank managers at 
institutions that might be candidates for acquisition.  Major potential costs of consolidation are 
reduced competition, especially in smaller markets, and the disruption of established commercial 
banking relationships between borrowers and the banks that are the targets of takeovers.  This 
disruption is likely to be especially severe for small businesses because such firms rely primarily 
upon banks for their credit needs (Cole and Wolken 1995, Cole et al. 1996).   Another potential 
problem associated with consolidation is the shortfall in small business lending that might arise 
if, as some critics of banking consolidation claim, large banks buy up smaller banks and use the 
newly acquired deposits as a source of funding for middle-market and larger loans originated by 
the main office of the merged entity.  Not addressed by this claim is the possibility that small 
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business borrowers turned away by large acquirers can transfer their business to small banks or 
other lenders operating in the same market. 
This study uses data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances 
(NSSBF) to investigate these issues by assessing whether banks involved in mergers or 
acquisitions were less likely to extend credit to small borrowers than banks not involved in 
takeover activities.  Also, the model that we use considers the reaction of other banks in the same 
banking markets to any possible merger-related reduction in credit to small borrowers.  
Specifically, we test whether banks not involved in takeover activity, but that are located in 
markets where other banks are involved in mergers or acquisitions are more likely to extend 
credit to small business borrowers.  Some analysts have claimed that such banks may step in to 
make up any shortfalls in small business credit availability attributable to takeover activities, and 
indeed, Berger et al (1997) found some evidence of this.   
Although previous researchers have examined these issues, they have been forced to rely 
upon data reported by banks to banking regulators, all of which suffer from several well-known 
problems when used to assess the availability of credit to small businesses.  For example, 
Strahan and Weston (1998) and Walraven (1997) use data from the mid-year Call Reports to 
examine whether banks involved in mergers devote more of less of their loan portfolios to small 
business loans than do other banks.1  The major problem presented by these data is that the Call 
Report data are aggregated by bank rather than reported by individual loan, so that the unit of 
observation is the bank rather than the small business borrower.  Berger et al. (1997) use data 
                                                 
1  Beginning in 1993, the June Call Report contains for each bank information on the number and 
volume outstanding of loans made in each of three size categories: less than $100,000, $100,000 
to $250,000, and $250,000 $1 million.   
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from the Survey of the Terms of Bank Lending (STBL), a survey conducted by the Federal 
Reserve Board, to analyze whether banks involved in mergers and acquisitions allocate more or 
less of their loan portfolios to small business borrowers. 2  Although using the STBL data brings 
the focus to individual loans, the STBL reports loans extended but not loans denied (a deficiency 
of the Call Report data as well).  Thus, Berger et al. (1997) also are forced to use the bank rather 
than the small business borrower as their unit of observation. 
 Our approach should prove superior to previous research based upon either the Call 
Report or the STBL because the unit of observation is the small business loan application rather 
than either aggregate small business lending at a depository institutions or successful loan 
applications at a sample of banks.  Because the 1993 NSSBF data are reported by small 
businesses, we can examine much more precisely the factors that affect whether a bank loan is 
extended to the firm, enabling us to test directly whether merger activity affects the likelihood 
that a bank will lend to small businesses. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
2  The Survey of Terms of Bank Lending is a quarterly survey of banks that has been conducted 
since 1977.  The survey panel includes approximately 50 banks with the largest volumes of 
commercial and industrial (C&I) loans and a stratified random sample of about 300 other banks. 
 During one week of each quarter, the banks report the terms (both price and nonprice) of the 
C&I loans that they close each day. 
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II.  Data 
The data analyzed in this study are taken from the 1993 National Survey of Small 
Business Finances (1993 NSSBF), which was co-sponsored and co-funded by the Federal 
Reserve Board and the U.S. Small Business Administration.  The firms surveyed constitute a 
nationally representative sample of small businesses operating in the United States as of year-
end 1992, where a small business is defined as a non-financial, non-farm business employing 
fewer than 500 full-time equivalent employees.  The sample was stratified by nine Census 
regions, urban or rural location, employment size, race, and ethnicity.  Data from the 1993 
NSSBF are broadly representative of approximately 5.0 million firms operating in the U.S. as of 
year-end 1992. 
The 1993 NSSBF provides detailed information about each firm's most recent borrowing 
experience, including whether or not the firm applied for credit, the identity and characteristics 
of the potential lender to which the firm applied, what other financial services (if any) the firm 
obtained from that potential lender, whether the potential lender denied or extended credit to the 
firm, and, if the lender extended credit, the terms of the loan.  The survey provides information 
on each firm’s balance sheet, income statement, and credit history.  The survey also collected 
other characteristics of the firm, including standard industrial classification, organizational form, 
and age; as well as demographic characteristics of each firm’s primary owner, including age, 
education, experience, and credit history. 3   
In total, there are 4,637 firms in the 1993 NSSBF.   Businesses located in urban areas 
account for 80 percent of respondents.  Seven percent of the sample firms are organized as 
                                                 
3  For a detailed description of the 1993 NSSBF, see Cole and Wolken (1995).  For a description 
of the 1987 NSSBF, which was used by Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995), 
see Elliehausen and Wolken (1990). 
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partnerships, 61 percent as corporations, and 32 percent as proprietorships.  Eighteen percent are 
owned by women and 22 percent are owned by minorities (African-Americans, Asians, and 
Hispanics).  Sample firms are concentrated in the retail and wholesale industries (31 percent) and 
the business and professional services industries (29 percent).  The median firm employs 5.5 
employees, records $400,000 in annual sales, and has $136,000 in total assets. 
We use information for each firm’s most recent borrowing experience from the 1993 
NSSBF  to choose loan applications at commercial banks and to identify the commercial bank 
where the application was made.  The 1993 NSSBF information indicates that 2,007 firms 
reported a most-recent-loan application.  Of these, 1,598 reported that these applications were 
made at a commercial bank.  However, the identity of the bank was not ascertainable for 79 of 
these applications, leaving a final sample of 1,519 observations of firm-bank pairs for our 
analysis.  
We cross-reference this 1993 NSSBF information with bank-specific information from 
the Federal Reserve System’s National Information Center (NIC) database that enables us for 
each firm-bank pair to determine whether the bank might have been involved in merger activity 
at the time of the loan application. 4   The exercise of labeling a bank as “involved in merger 
activity” is a bit arbitrary because the NIC database records the date of a merger as the day that 
the union is consummated legally.  For some time before that date, an interval often spanning a 
number of months, both parties to the merger, officials at the acquiring and acquired institutions, 
                                                 
4  To confirm the identity of a firm’s source of financial services, the firm had to provide the 
source’s name, city, state, and zip code.  This information was cross-referenced with data the 
Federal Reserve Board’s National Information Center to verify that the source identified by the 
firm indeed had an office located in the zip code provided by the firm. 
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and potential borrowers are aware that the merger is underway, and any of these parties may 
behave differently than economic agents dealing with a bank where no merger is underway.   
As a result, we use five indicator variables to characterize the merger status of the bank: 
(1) Acquirer Before Loan Application indicates a bank that acquired another bank during the 18 
months prior to the loan application, this is the period of adjustment that most researchers have 
considered when assessing the effects of mergers; (2) Acquirer After Loan Application indicates 
a bank that acquired another bank during the 18 months subsequent to the loan application, this 
indicator spans the time after a merger has been announced, or possibly is in the works, and the 
date that it legally is completed; (3) Target Before Loan Application indicates a bank that was 
acquired by another bank during the 18 months prior to the loan application; (4) Target After 
Loan Application indicates a bank that was acquired by another bank during the 18 months 
subsequent to the loan application; and (5) Market Merger indicates that a bank located in the 
market area of the small business loan applicant had been involved in a merger or acquisition 
during the 18 months prior to the loan application.  The Market Merger variable reflects merger 
activity among the competitors of the specific bank that received the loan application and is 
distinct from dummies for the merger activity of the bank that received the loan application, i.e., 
Market Merger can be true whether or not any of the other merger variables are true.  Banking 
markets are defined as the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in which the small business 
was headquartered for small businesses that are located in urban areas and as the county of the 
headquarters for firms located in rural areas. 
As shown in Table 1, our sample of 1,519 firm-bank pairs contains 253 observations 
(16.7 percent) where the bank that received the loan application was an acquirer during the 18 
months before the application; 296 observations (19.5 percent) where the bank was an acquirer 
during the 18 months after the loan application; 84 observations (5.5 percent) where the bank 
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was a target during the 18 months before the loan application; and 174 observations (11.5 
percent) where the bank was a target during the 18 months after the application.   In addition, 
there are 1,251 (82.4 percent) observations where the banking market of the loan applicant was 
the site of a bank merger during the 18 months before the loan application. 
Of the 1,519 firms in our sample, all of which applied for a bank loan, 231 or 15.2 
percent were denied credit.  Firms applying at a bank that recently had acquired another bank 
were rejected 16.2 percent of the time (41 of 253), while firms applying at a bank that acquired 
another bank soon after the loan application were rejected 14.2 percent of the time (42 of 296).  
Firms applying at a bank that had been acquired by another bank were rejected 13.1 percent of 
the time (11 of 84), while firms applying at a bank that later was acquired by another bank were 
rejected 17.8 percent of the time (31 of 174).  Firms applying at banks located in merger markets 
were rejected 16.5 percent of the time (206 of 1251).  Firms applying in markets where no 
mergers occurred were least likely to be rejected (24 of 245, or 9.8 percent). 
Of course, factors other than the merger status of the prospective lending bank influence 
whether or not a bank extends credit to a potential borrower.  From the perspective of the lender, 
the primary concern in deciding whether or not to extend credit to a firm is the probability of 
default.  The literature on residential mortgage lending provides a rich set of potential factors 
that the lender might use to assess a prospective borrower’s default risk (Munnell et al. 1996), 
and many of these are likely to useful in evaluating small business borrowers as well as 
residential mortgage borrowers.   
One set of these factors is related to financial characteristics of the firm, and many of 
these factors were collected for each firm in the 1993 NSSBF data base.  In this study, we 
include the credit history, age, size, leverage, profitability, and organizational form of the firm; 
as well as the firm’s pre-existing relationships (if any) with its prospective lender.  The credit 
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history of the firm is the number of business delinquencies during the past three years. The age 
of the firm is measured as (the natural logarithm of ) the number of years the firm has been in 
business under current ownership.  Size is measured by (the natural logarithms of) total assets 
and annual sales.  Leverage is measured by the ratio of total equity to total assets.  Profitability is 
return on assets.  Organizational form is proxied by a set of dummy variables indicating whether 
the firm is organized as a proprietorship, partnership, or corporation. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), and Cole (1998) provide evidence 
that the availability of credit to small businesses is a function of the firm’s pre-existing 
relationships with its prospective lender.  Consequently, we also include variables to control for 
the strength of firm-lender relationships. Specifically, we include a variable indicating the length 
of the firm’s pre-existing relationship with its prospective lender, a dummy variable indicating 
firms that had no pre-existing relationship with the prospective lender, and a variable indicating 
the number of sources from which the firm obtains financial services.   
Characteristics of the primary owner of the firm also might have influenced the lending 
decision of the bank to which the firm applied for credit.  In this study, the credit worthiness of 
the primary owner is proxied by the number of times during the past three years he or she was  
delinquent on personal financial obligations.5  We also include dummy variables for the  
education of the primary owner at the high school level and beyond college.  
The general economic environment in which the firm operates also might affect the 
bank’s perception of the likelihood of repayment.  We include the percentage change in annual 
average employment from 1992 to 1993 for the county in which the firm is located as an 
indicator of the strength of the local economy.  In addition, we include the Herfindahl index of 
                                                 
5  More specifically, survey respondents were asked the following two questions:  (1)  Within the 
past three years, on how many different personal obligations has the principal owner been 60 or 
more days delinquent?  (2)  Within the past three years, on how many different business 
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banking market concentration for the firm’s market area.  Finally, we include a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not the firm was located in an urban area, where urban areas are defined as 
MSAs. 
                                                                                                                                                             
obligations has the firm been 60 or more days delinquent? 
A final set of factors that might affect the likelihood of the firm obtaining a loan relate to 
the financial condition and organization of the bank itself.  At the individual bank level, we 
include the (natural logarithm of) the assets of the bank, the ratio of equity to assets, the rate of 
delinquencies, and the ratio of the loss allowance to total loans.  To examine whether affiliation 
with a bank holding company affects the results, we include a dummy variable for membership 
in a bank holding company.  In addition, we aggregate the financial data to the highest holding 
company, and for members of bank holding companies, we construct an additional group of the 
financial variables (assets, capital ratios, delinquencies, and loss allowances) for the holding 
company, while we include  zeroes for these variables if the bank is independent. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for each of the potential explanatory variables, 
both for the entire sample and separately for applications that were denied and applications that 
were accepted.  Also presented are the results of a t-test for differences in the mean values of the 
explanatory variables for the group of  applicants who were denied credit and the group whose 
applications were approved. 
Firms denied credit were smaller as measured by annual sales ($0.33 million versus $1.56 
million); had fewer assets ($0.13 million versus $0.61 million); had more business delinquencies 
(1.22 versus 0.52); were more likely to have been denied trade credit (25 percent versus 8 
percent); had a shorter pre-existing relationship with the prospective lending bank (5.77 years 
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versus 8.67 years); obtained financial services from fewer sources (1.65 versus 1.80); had greater 
leverage (0.85 versus 0.70); were younger (8.25 years versus 12.30 years); and were less likely 
to have developed a pre-existing financial relationship with the bank where they sought credit 
(0.13 versus 0.02).  With the exceptions of the number of sources of financial services, the return 
on assets, and whether the firm was organized as a partnership, each of the differences in these 
means is statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level, and most are significant at the 0.01 
level. 
Primary owners who were denied credit tended to have more nonbusiness delinquencies 
(0.81 versus 0.18) and to be members of a minority group (0.34 versus 0.12).  Both of these 
variables were significant at the 0.01 level.  Neither of the education variables (High-school 
education and Some post-college education) differ significantly between the groups of firms 
denied and accepted.  
Firms denied credit tended to be located in areas with slower employment growth (1.77 
percent versus 2.15 percent); tended to be located in areas with less concentrated banking; and 
were more likely to be located in urban than rural areas (86 percent versus 76 percent).  Only the 
banking-market concentration and urban location variables were significant at least at the 0.05 
level. 
Banks that denied credit to small business applicants tended to be larger ($2.4 billion 
versus $1.2 billion); had lower capital ratios (7.9 percent versus 8.2 percent); higher rates of 
delinquencies (3.4 percent versus 2.8 percent); and higher loan-loss provisions as a proportion of 
loans (2.4 percent versus 2.1 percent).  When the data were aggregated to the bank holding 
company level, the differences in financial variables between banking organizations that denied 
and those that approved loan applications tended to match the differences that were noted at the 
bank level, with the exception of the capital ratio. 
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III.  Methodology 
In examining the factors influencing the probability of loan denial, a single-equation 
binary logit model is an obvious choice, and it has two desirable properties.  First, it yields 
unbiased and consistent parameter estimates; second, it enables us to make acceptable inferences 
about the firms that apply for a loan.  Hence, we use the logit model in the analysis that follows.  
The probability-of-denial equation is: 
 
D*j    =    β ' x j   +    ε j  (1) 
 
where D*j is an unobservable index of the probability that a firm’s loan application will be 
denied by its potential lender; xj is a vector of characteristics of both the firm and the potential 
lender, including the merger status of the potential lender; β is a vector of parameter estimates 
for the independent variables; εj is a normally distributed random disturbance term with zero 
mean and unknown constant variance σj2; and j = 1, 2, . . . , M; where M is the total number of 
firms applying for credit.  Let Dj be an observable variable that is equal to one if D*j > 0 and zero 
if D*j ≤ 0.  
In this particular application, Dj is equal to one if a firm is denied credit and zero 
otherwise. Since D*j is equal to β ' xj   +    ε j  , the probability that D*j > 0 is equal to the 
probability that β' xj  +  εj  > 0, or, equivalently, the probability that εj > - β  xj.  Therefore, one 
can write the probability that Dj is equal to one as the probability that (εj > - β  xj) , or, 
equivalently, that Prob (Dj = 1) = 1 - Φ (-β  xj), where Φ is the cumulative distribution function 
of  εj, here assumed to be logistic.  The probability that Dj is equal to zero is then simply Φ (-β  
xj).  The likelihood function L for this model is: 
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L   =   Π  [Φ (-β  xj)]   Π[1 - Φ (-β  xj)]  (2) 
                    Dj = 0                      Dj = 1 
 
 
IV.  Results 
Table 3 presents the results from estimating the logit model of loan denial for six 
different specifications that reflect the sequential addition of selected groups of explanatory 
variables.  Rather than present the actual coefficients of the logit regression, which are difficult 
to interpret, we present the odds ratio, which is the relative increase or decrease in the 
probability of loan denial for a one unit change in the explanatory variable.  For a binary 
variable, the odds ratio indicates the likelihood of loan denial when the binary variable equals 
one relative to the likelihood of loan denial where the binary variable equals zero.6 
Column 2 contains the results when the four merger status dummy variables are collapsed 
into a single indicator variable Any Merger (which is equal to 1 if any of the four merger status 
variables are equal to 1, and equal to 0 otherwise), and this composite variable is included in a 
logit regression along with the variable Merger Market.  The results in column 2 show that the 
value for Any Merger is less than one, suggesting that loan applicants at banks involved in 
mergers were less likely to be denied a loan, but the estimate was not statistically significant.  In 
contrast, the estimate for Merger Market is highly significant, and its odds ratio indicates that 
small business credit applicants in markets where mergers have occurred are more likely to be 
                                                 
6  Hosmer and Lemshow (1989) present a detailed description of how to interpret the odds ratio 
associated with logistic regression. 
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denied a loan.  Together, these results appear to contradict the hypotheses that takeover activity 
reduces the availability of credit to small businesses and that competing banks in merger markets 
pick up the slack in small business lending created by takeover activity. 
Column 3 shows that when we include the complete set of five merger-status variables, 
only one—Merger Market—is statistically significant (p-value = 0.002).  The odds ratio 
associated with this variable indicates that applications for credit by firms in markets where there 
has been a merger during the 18 months prior to the application are more than twice as likely to 
be denied than applications at banks located in non-merger markets (Note that Merger Market is 
distinct from whether or not the bank that received the loan application has been involved in a 
merger.)  
In column 4, we augment the bank merger variables with a group of variables that 
describe the firm.  Log of annual sales—a control for the size of the firm applying for credit—is 
highly significant (p-value = 0.0001), and its associated odds ratio is less than one, indicating 
that larger firms are less likely to be denied credit.  Business delinquencies and Trade credit 
denied also are highly significant, and their odds ratios indicates that more delinquencies on 
business credit obligations and previous trade credit denials reduce the probability of obtaining a 
loan.  Log of firm age is significant and its odds ratio is less than one, indicating that older firms 
are more likely to receive a loan.  None of the remaining firm variables (Log of firm assets, 
Length of pre-existing relationship with lender, Leverage, Return on assets, Partnership, and 
Corporation) are significant.  When we control for these characteristics of the business,  Merger 
Market remains highly significant, while the other bank merger variables remain insignificant. 
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In column 5, we add a group of variables that describe better the characteristics of the 
firm’s primary owner.  Neither of the variables describing the level of education of the primary 
owner has a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of obtaining a loan.  However, higher 
incidence of the primary owner’s personal delinquencies significantly increases the likelihood 
that the firm’s credit application is rejected.  Inclusion of the borrower variables does not alter 
qualitatively the results for the merger status variables.  
In column 6, we add both a group of variables that describe the type of market in which 
the firm is located and a group of financial and structural characteristics of the bank that received 
the loan application.  None of these variables are statistically significant by themselves, but when 
they are included as controls, the coefficient of Acquirer after loan application (banks that 
acquire another bank after the loan application) becomes significant (p-value=0.02).  The odds 
ratio of 0.58 for this variable indicates that banks planning to make an acquisition are less likely 
to deny credit to small business borrowers.  One explanation for this finding is that aggressive 
managers attempting to grow by way of acquisitions also are attempting to grow by expanding 
credit to small businesses. 
In column 7, we present our final specification, where we augment the variables 
appearing in column 6 with two additional dummy variables.   The first (Urban) indicates that 
the lender is located in an urban rather than a rural area and the last (No relationship with lender) 
indicates that the firm has established no pre-existing financial relationship with the bank where 
it is seeking the loan.  In this particular specification, Urban is statistically insignificant, but No 
relationship with lender is significant and has an odds ratios greater than one, indicating that the 
probability of loan denial is significantly greater for firms that have not established a pre-
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existing relationship with the prospective lender.7  Inclusion of these last control variables 
renders the Merger Market variable insignificant, but the Acquirer after loan application 
variable remains significant (p-value=0.04).  Hence, even after we control for business variables, 
borrower variables, market variables, and bank characteristics, we find evidence that bank 
takeover activity affects the availability of credit to small businesses. 
We find that takeover activity is associated with greater rather than lesser availability of 
credit to small businesses.  This study differs somewhat from the mixed results of Berger et al. 
1997, which tended to focus on the longer-term adjustment of the portfolios of the consolidated 
bank.  That study found that banking consolidation, when the acquirer was large, could lead to 
reduced credit availability to small businesses.  However, the results of this paper are consistent 
with Walraven (1997), which found that acquiring banks tended to be banks with higher portions 
of small business loans.  This finding has important policy implications, in that it is inconsistent 
with the hypothesis that bank mergers reduce the availability of credit to small businesses.  
Indeed, the results suggest that, to some degree, bank mergers are associated with greater 
availability of credit to small businesses. 
 
                                                 
7  The results for the firm-lender relationship variables are broadly consistent with those reported 
by Cole (1998). 
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V.  Summary and Conclusions 
This study uses data from the National Survey of Small Business Finances to test the 
hypothesis that bank mergers reduce the availability of credit to small businesses.  After 
controlling (to the extent that the survey data allow) for special characteristics of the loan 
applicant (including both features of the firm and its principal owner), the financial condition 
and organizational structure of the prospective lender, and characteristics of the market where 
the firm is located, we find that bank takeover activity is associated with greater rather than 
reduced availability of credit to small businesses.  Specifically, we find that one set of banks 
involved in merger activity— those that either are in the process of acquiring another bank or 
those that are “shopping” for an acquisition in the near future—are significantly more likely to 
extend credit to small businesses than other banks.  This result suggests that more aggressive 
lenders may be attempting to expand their business both through increasing their own 
originations of loans to small businesses as well as through acquisitions of other banks.  These 
findings have important implications for bank regulatory policy, in that they provide evidence 
that consolidation in the banking industry did not adversely affect the availability of credit to 
small businesses, at least through 1994.  Of course, banking consolidation has continued at a 
rapid pace since then, pointing to the need for additional data on small business credit 
availability.  Also not addressed is how banking consolidation has affected the terms of credit 
available to small businesses.  We leave these as two interesting areas for future research. 
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Table 1 
Bank loan denials and approvals in a sample of 1,519 applications by small businesses 
for bank credit during 1991-94.  Separate statistics are presented for applications at 
banks that were targets or acquirers involved in mergers during the two years 
surrounding the credit application.  Separate statistics also are presented for 
applications at banks not necessarily involved in a merger but located in banking 
markets where mergers did occur.  Banking markets are defined as MSAs for firms 
located in urban areas and as counties for firms located in rural areas.  
 
 
 
All   
applications 
(column percentage) 
 
Applications  
denied 
(row percentage) 
 
Applications 
approved  
(row percentage)  
 
All loan 
applications  
 
 
 
1,519 
(100%) 
 
 
231  
(15.2%) 
 
 
1,288 
(84.8%) 
 
 
Applications at  
acquiring banks 
prior 
 
 
253 
(16.7%) 
 
 
 41 
(16.2%) 
 
 
212 
(83.8%) 
 
 
Applications at  
acquiring banks 
post 
 
 
296 
(19.5%) 
 
 
42 
(14.2%) 
 
 
254 
(85.8%) 
 
 
Applications at  
target banks prior 
 
 
84 
(5.5%) 
 
 
11  
(13.1%) 
 
 
73 
(86.9%)  
 
Applications at  
target banks post 
 
 
174 
(11.5%) 
 
 
 31 
(17.8%) 
 
 
143 
(82.2%)  
 
Applications in 
merger markets     
 
 
1251 
(82.4%) 
 
 
206 
(16.5%) 
 
 
1045 
(83.5%)  
 
Applications in 
markets with no 
mergers 
 
  
           245 
         (16.1%) 
 
 
            24 
          (9.8%) 
 
 
           221 
         (90.2%) 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for characteristics of a sample of 1,519 applications by small businesses for bank 
credit during 1991-94.  Statistics are presented for all applications and for applications that were denied 
or approved. Standard errors appear in parentheses.  In the last column are the values for t-tests of the 
significance of the differences in the mean values of applications denied and applications approved.  
 
Variable 
 
All  
Applications 
 
Applications  
denied 
 
Applications 
approved 
 
t-value 
 
Merger Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Acquirer before loan 
application 
 
0.167 
 
0.177 
(0.03) 
 
0.165 
(0.01) 
 
-0.48 
 
Acquirer after loan 
application 
 
0.195 
 
0.182 
(0.03) 
 
0.197 
(0.01) 
 
 0.54  
 
Target before loan 
application 
 
0.055 
 
0.048 
(0.01) 
 
0.057 
(0.01) 
 
0.55 
 
Target after loan application 
 
0.115 
 
0.134 
(0.02) 
 
0.111 
(0.01) 
 
-1.02  
 
Merger market 
 
 
0.824 
 
0.892 
(0.02) 
 
0.811 
(0.01) 
 
  -2.96*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Business Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Log of annual sales  
 
14.03 
 
12.72 
(0.12) 
 
14.26 
(0.05) 
 
11.25* 
 
Log of assets 
 
13.09 
 
11.81 
(0.13) 
 
13.32 
(0.06) 
 
10.47* 
 
Business’s  
delinquencies 
 
0.62 
 
1.22 
(0.09) 
 
0.52 
(0.09) 
 
-8.61* 
 
Trade credit denied 
 
0.10 
 
0.25 
(0.03) 
 
0.08 
(0.01) 
 
-8.27* 
 
Length of pre-existing 
relationship with lender 
 
8.22 
 
5.77 
(0.40) 
 
8.67 
(0.24) 
 
4.84* 
 
Number of sources for 
financial services 
 
1.78 
 
1.65 
(0.06) 
 
1.80 
(0.03) 
 
1.90  
 
Leverage 
 
0.72 
 
0.85 
(0.04) 
 
0.70 
(0.03) 
 
-2.31* 
 
Return on assets 
 
0.33 
 
0.34 
(0.08) 
 
0.32 
(0.08) 
 
-0.09 
 
Partnership 
 
0.07 
 
0.06 
(0.02) 
 
0.07 
(0.01) 
 
0.73 
 
Corporation 
 
0.75 
 
0.68 
(0.03) 
 
0.77 
(0.01) 
 
2.92* 
 
Log of firm age 
 
2.45 
 
2.11 
(0.05) 
 
2.51 
(0.02) 
 
7.05* 
 
No relationship with lender 
 
 
0.04 
 
0.13 
(0.02) 
 
0.02 
(0.00) 
 
-7.27* 
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Variable All  
Applications 
Applications  
denied 
Applications 
approved 
t-value 
 
Borrower Variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
High school education 
 
0.17 
 
0.17 
(0.24) 
 
0.18 
(0.01) 
 
0.27 
 
Some post-college education 
 
0.61 
 
0.20 
(0.03) 
 
0.23 
(0.01) 
 
0.93 
 
Personal delinquencies 
 
0.27 
 
0.81 
(0.08) 
 
0.18 
(0.02) 
 
-11.27* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Market Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Employment growth in area 
 
2.09 
 
1.77 
(0.18) 
 
2.15 
(0.08) 
 
1.87 
 
Herfindahl index of bank 
concentration 
 
0.20 
 
0.18 
(0.01) 
 
0.20 
(0.00) 
 
2.11* 
 
Urban area 
 
0.76 
 
 
0.86 
(0.02) 
 
0.76 
(0.01) 
 
-3.40* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Bank characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Membership in a bank 
holding company 
 
0.90 
 
0.93 
(0.02) 
 
0.90 
(0.01) 
 
-1.37 
 
Log of assets (bank) 
 
14.07 
 
14.67 
(0.15) 
 
13.96 
(0.06) 
 
-4.51* 
 
Equity / assets (bank) 
 
8.12 
 
7.85 
(0.00) 
 
8.17 
(0.00) 
 
2.47* 
 
Delinquencies / total loans 
(bank) 
 
2.9 
 
3.36 
(0.00) 
 
2.84 
(0.00) 
 
-3.01* 
 
Loan loss allowance / total 
loans (bank) 
 
2.17 
 
2.37 
(0.08) 
 
2.13 
(0.04) 
 
-2.60* 
 
Log of assets (holding 
company) 
 
15.15 
 
15.77 
(0.17) 
 
15.04 
(0.07) 
 
-3.91* 
 
Equity / assets (holding 
company) 
 
8.29 
 
8.20 
(0.12) 
 
8.30 
(0.05) 
 
-0.83 
 
Delinquencies / total loans 
(holding company) 
 
2.9 
 
3.37 
(0.19) 
 
2.8 
(0.06) 
 
-3.49* 
 
Loan loss allowance / total 
loans (holding company) 
 
2.12 
 
2.31 
(0.06) 
 
2.09 
(0.03) 
 
-3.38* 
 
* Indicates that the difference in means is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
−23− 
  
Table 3 
Logistic regression results for a sample of 1,519 applications by small businesses for bank credit during 
1991-94.  Dependent variable is whether a bank approved or denied the firm’s loan application.  For 
each variable, the first row is its Odds Ratio and the value in parentheses is the p-value of the 
coefficient.  The coefficient itself is not shown.  
(1) 
Variable 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
Merger Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Any merger 
 
 
0.94 
(0.65) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Acquirer before loan 
application 
 
-- 
 
0.99 
(0.96) 
 
1.19 
(0.42) 
 
1.22 
(0.37) 
 
0.81 
(0.38) 
 
0.88 
(0.63)  
Acquirer after loan 
application 
 
-- 
 
0.79 
(0.23) 
 
0.89 
(0.58) 
 
0.88 
(0.56) 
 
0.58* 
(0.02) 
 
0.59** 
(0.04)  
Target before loan 
application 
 
-- 
 
0.74 
(0.37) 
 
0.74 
(0.40) 
 
0.73 
(0.38) 
 
0.86 
(0.70) 
 
0.89 
(0.78)  
Target after loan application 
 
-- 
 
1.10 
(0.67) 
 
0.89 
(0.64) 
 
0.87 
(0.57) 
 
0.10 
(0.99) 
 
1.02 
(0.93)  
Merger market 
 
 
1.98** 
(0.004) 
 
2.03** 
(0.002) 
 
2.56* 
(0.003) 
 
2.67* 
(0.002) 
 
1.96** 
(0.02) 
 
1.65 
(0.14)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Business Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Log of annual sales  
 
 
 
 
 
0.69* 
(0.0001) 
 
0.71* 
(0.0001) 
 
0.67* 
(0.0001) 
 
0.69* 
(0.0001)  
Log of assets 
 
 
 
 
 
0.90 
(0.16) 
 
0.90 
(0.16) 
 
0.93 
(0.32) 
 
0.94 
(0.45)  
Business’s  
delinquencies 
 
 
 
 
 
1.45* 
(0.0001) 
 
1.28* 
(0.001) 
 
1.28* 
(0.002) 
 
1.33 
(0.0004)  
Trade credit denied 
 
 
 
 
 
2.76* 
(0.0001) 
 
2.67 
(0.0001)* 
 
2.60* 
(0.0001) 
 
2.45* 
(0.0004)  
Length of pre-existing 
relationship with lender 
 
 
 
 
 
0.98 
(0.18) 
 
0.98 
(0.17) 
 
0.99 
(0.46) 
 
1.01 
(0.65)  
Number of sources for 
financial services 
 
 
 
 
 
0.94 
(0.54) 
 
0.93 
(0.44) 
 
0.95 
(0.60) 
 
0.88 
(0.23)  
Leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
0.94 
(0.42) 
 
0.94 
(0.37) 
 
0.97 
(0.67) 
 
0.96 
(0.58)  
Return on assets 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
(0.96) 
 
1.00 
(0.81) 
 
1.00 
(0.91) 
 
1.01 
(0.59)  
Partnership 
 
 
 
 
 
0.75 
(0.45) 
 
0.78 
(0.53) 
 
0.76 
(0.50) 
 
0.78 
(0.56)  
Corporation 
 
 
 
 
 
1.26 
(0.29) 
 
1.30 
(0.25) 
 
1.19 
(0.47) 
 
1.15 
(0.56)  
Log of firm age 
 
 
 
 
 
0.78** 
(0.05) 
 
0.80 
(0.08) 
 
0.78 
(0.07) 
 
0.75** 
(0.04)  
No relationship with lender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
5.28* 
(0.0001)        
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(1) 
Variable 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Borrower Variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
High school education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.90 
(0.63) 
 
1.04 
(0.88) 
 
1.08 
(0.74)  
Some post-college education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.87 
(0.49) 
 
0.86 
(0.49) 
 
0.90 
(0.61)  
Personal delinquencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.35* 
(0.001) 
 
1.40* 
(0.0004) 
 
1.38* 
(0.001)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Market Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Employment growth in area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.98 
(0.43) 
 
0.97 
(0.36)  
Herfindahl index of bank 
concentration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.37 
(0.37) 
 
0.56 
(0.62)  
Urban area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-- 
 
1.85 
(0.71)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Bank characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Membership in a bank 
holding company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.22 
(0.58) 
 
1.33 
(0.45)  
Log of assets (bank) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.09 
(0.32) 
 
1.04 
(0.85)  
Equity / assets (bank) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00 
(0.27) 
 
0.00 
(0.34)  
Delinquencies / total loans 
(bank) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00 
(0.56) 
 
0.01 
(0.66)  
Loan loss allowance / total 
loans (bank) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.96 
(0.68) 
 
0.93 
(0.55)  
Interaction of log of assets 
with urban area  (bank) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-- 
 
1.03 
(0.87)  
Log of assets (holding 
company) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.12 
(0.11) 
 
1.18 
(0.28)  
Equity / assets (holding 
company) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.04 
(0.70) 
 
1.04 
(0.70)  
Delinquencies / total loans 
(holding company) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.10 
(0.38) 
 
1.08 
(0.49)  
Loan loss allowance / total 
loans (holding company) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.23 
(0.17) 
 
1.26 
(0.15)  
Interaction of log of assets 
with urban area  
(holding company) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.95 
(0.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Pseudo-R Square 
 
0.01 
 
  0.01   
 
0.19 
 
0.20 
 
0.24 
 
0.26  
**, * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
